

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY

USINT CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY

AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY

USLO PEKING PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

CINCLANT PRIORITY

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

CINCUSNAVEUR PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

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EXDIS ALSO FOR POLADS CINCLANT, CINCPAC AND CINCUSNAVEUR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR/IO/UK

SUBJECT: US PLANS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN/ARABIAN SEA AREA

REF: TEHRAN 0043 (NOTAL)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE RATIONALE WE HAVE PROVIDED THE BRITISH, AT THEIR REQUEST, FOR US NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN/ARABIAN SEA AREA IN CONNECTION WITH OUR PROPOSED PLANS TO EXPAND DIEGO GARCIA. EMBASSY MAY DRAW ON THIS RATIONALE TO MEET THE NEEDS CITED IN REFTEL, BUT EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE NO REFERENCE AT THIS TIME TO PLANS TO EXPAND OUR FACILITIES AT DIEGO GARCIA BEYOND ACKNOWLEDGING THAT WE ARE DISCUSSING SUBJECT WITH BRITISH, AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS. WHEN WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE UK ON DIEGO GARCIA, TEHRAN, AND ALL OTHER CONCERNED POSTS WILL BE PROVIDED WITH APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE FOR NOTIFYING HOST GOVERNMENTS.

2. FOR INFORMATION ADDRESSEES: RATIONALE IS BEING PROVIDED TO YOU ON A STRICTLY FYI BASIS.

3. RATIONALE FOR US NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA AND FOR THE PROPOSED EXPANSION OF FACILITIES AT DIEGO GARCIA: QUOTE

A. IN SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON NOVEMBER 30, 1973, HE NOTED THAT "WE ARE ALL AWARE OF THE ENHANCED INTEREST THAT APPLIES TO THE INDIAN OCEAN." SECRETARY SCHLESINGER ADDED THAT IT WAS THE INTENTION OF THE US TO REESTABLISH THE PATTERN OF REGULAR VISITS INTO
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THE INDIAN OCEAN THAT HAD BEEN DISRUPTED BY THE VIETNAM WAR AND THAT "WE EXPECT THAT OUR PRESENCE THERE WILL BE MORE FREQUENT AND MORE REGULAR THAN IN THE PAST."

B. RECENT AND CURRENT US NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA ARE COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY OF PERIODICALLY AUGMENTING THE MINIMAL PERMANENT PRESENCE WE HAVE MAINTAINED IN THE AREA FOR OVER A GENERATION. THE MOVEMENT OF THE HANCOCK CARRIER TASK GROUP INTO THE ARABIAN SEA AREA LAST NOVEMBER THUS WAS NOT ONLY IN CONSONANCE WITH OUR HISTORIC PRACTICE OF EXERCISING OUR NAVAL FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AROUND THE WORLD BUT HAS ALSO KEYED TO EVENTS OF CONSEQUENCE TO

THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION. THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT WAS PROMPTED BY THE SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THEIR CAPABILITY TO INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL FORCES QUICKLY INTO THE AREA. BROADLY SPEAKING, THE SOVIETS HAD DEMONSTRATED AN INCREASED READINESS TO USE MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY SHOWS OF FORCE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS WHERE MAJOR US INTERESTS WERE AT STAKE AND TO PROJECT MILITARY POWER TO DISTANT AREAS, TO INCLUDE THE INDIAN OCEAN, AS SOVIET NAVAL FORCES AND AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES GREW. WITH THE PROBABLE OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL WITHIN THE NEXT TWO YEARS, A STILL GREATER SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WILL BE BOTH POSSIBLE AND PROBABLE.

C. IN THE FOREGOING CONTEXT, THE HANCOCK, IN OUR JUDGMENT, PROVIDED A CLEAR SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS OF OUR RESOLVE TO ENSURE A CREDIBLE MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE BROAD INDIAN OCEAN AREA. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE PRESENCE OF US NAVAL FORCES IN THE ARABIAN SEA/WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN AREA WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A SALUTARY EFFECT ON THE SOVIETS BY UNDERSCORING OUR STRATEGIC MOBILITY. WE WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE DO NOT CONSIDER OUR NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS A THREAT TO ANY NATION OR GROUP OF NATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, NO SPECIFIC TASKS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED OUR FORCES EXCEPT TO MAINTAIN GENERAL OPERATIONAL PROFICIENCY WHILE ON STATION IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, THE PRESENCE OF THESE FORCES ASSURES US AN ADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO MEET CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS INVOLVING FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS ON OR NEAR THE INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL, AS WELL
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AS OFFERING A DETERRENT EFFECT TO POTENTIAL HARASSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AND SEA LANES. THIS TAKES ON ADDED SIGNIFICANCE IN VIEW OF THE RAPIDLY GROWING REALIZATION OF THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE RESOURCES OF THE PERSIAN GULF TO THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THIS REALIZATION HAS FOCUSED ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE GENERAL AREA.

D. IN SUM, OUR CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY A NAVAL FORCE INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN SUPPORTS NOT ONLY THE US NATIONAL INTEREST BUT THE INTEREST OF OUR CLOSEST FRIENDS AND ALLIES AS SUCH FORCE PROVIDES A TANGIBLE REMINDER OF OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN SECURITY AND STABILITY DURING A TIME OF UNCERTAINTY AFFECTING THE BROAD INDIAN OCEAN AREA AS WELL AS THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF. HOWEVER, MAINTAINING NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN/ARABIAN SEA AREA IS NOT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. THE SHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED SINCE EARLY NOVEMBER HAVE COME FROM 7TH FLEET RESOURCES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC. IN VIEW OF THE EXTENDED DISTANCES INVOLVED, IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO

SECURE BUNKERING AND LIMITED FACILITY SUPPORT FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. THIS HAS BEEN PROVIDED PRIMARILY BY IRAN AND BY THE UK. HOWEVER, IN LOOKING AHEAD, IF WE WISH TO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO MOVE OR MAINTAIN OUR NAVAL SHIPS IN THE AREA, DEVELOPMENT OF MORE VIABLE SUPPORT FACILITIES SEEMS ESSENTIAL. THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM IS DIEGO GARCIA, WITH SOME SUPPLEMENTARY BUNKERING AND AIRCRAFT LANDING RIGHTS ELSEWHERE IN THE AREA.

E. CONSEQUENTLY, WE INTEND TO EXPAND OUR COMMUNICATION FACILITY ON THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA IN ORDER TO MAKE IT A USEFUL AND EFFECTIVE SUPPORT FACILITY FOR THE US FORCES OPERATING IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA. EVENTUALLY, THIS FACILITY WILL BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR A FLEXIBLE RANGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS INCLUDING REPAIRS, BUNKERING, AIRCRAFT STAGING, AND ENHANCED COMMUNICATIONS.

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F. THE CURRENT SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS BUDGET WHICH IS NOW BEING PRESENTED TO CONGRESS CONTAINS A REQUEST FOR \$29 MILLION TO COVER PART OF THE EXPENSES WHICH WOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH AN UPGRADING OF THE SUPPORT FACILITIES ON DIEGO GARCIA. THE SPECIFIC PROJECTS WE HAVE IN MIND ARE AN INCREASED FUEL STORAGE CAPACITY, DEEPENING OF THE LAGOON TO PROVIDE AN ANCHORAGE, LENGTHENING OF THE EXISTING 8000 FOOT RUNWAY, AND EXPANDING THE

AIRFIELD RAMP AREA, IN ADDITION TO CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS TO OUR EXISTING COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AND CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL QUARTERS.

(WE PROPOSE THAT ABOVE CLASSIFIED RATIONALE BE USED ON EXPURGATED BASIS FOR OUR PRESENTATION TO THE CONGRESS..
FOR OUR
CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSES, WE ALSO PROPOSE TO ADD FOLLOWING:)

G. AS MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE MAY RECALL, THE BRITISH SEQUESTERED A NUMBER OF INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS UNDER THEIR CONTROL IN 1965 INTO WHAT WAS KNOWN AS THE BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY. BY AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES EFFECTED ON DECEMBER 30, 1966, THE US AND UK AGREED THAT THESE ISLANDS WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS FOR A PERIOD OF 50 YEARS FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES. UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS ARRANGEMENT, BOTH GOVERNMENTS AGREED IN DECEMBER, 1970, TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY ON DIEGO GARCIA IN THE CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO. CURRENT PLANS TO DEVELOP EXPANDED LOGISTIC SUPPORT FACILITIES AT DIEGO GARCIA ARE IN COMPLETE ACCORD WITH THE INTENT AND BASIC PHILOSOPHY SET FORTH IN THE

ORIGINAL 1966 AGREEMENT FOR OUR USE OF THE ISLANDS
FOR GENERAL DEFENSE PURPOSES. IN FACT, THE VERY NATURE
OF THE ARRANGEMENT FOR THE USE OF THE NON-INHABITED ISLAND
OF THE BIOT VIRTUALLY ELIMINATES ANY MID- OR LONG-TERM
PROBLEMS SIMILAR TO THE RESTRICTIONS ON OUR OPERATIONAL
FLEXIBILITY ENCOUNTERED IN THE RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL DURING
THE RECENT ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. WE WILL BE OPERATING FROM
WHAT, IN FACT, IS A SELF-SUSTAINED LOGISTICS SUPPORT
FACILITY IN THE OUTER REACHES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN WITH
MINIMAL POLITICAL OR MILITARY VISIBILITY. THUS, WE CAN
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CONCLUDE WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE THAT OF ALL
CONCEIVABLE ALTERNATIVES TO ASSURE OUR CONTINUED ABILITY
TO DEPLOY OUR NAVAL FORCES TO THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE

UTILIZATION OF DIEGO GARCIA IS FAR AND AWAY THE PREFERRED
OPTION. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

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JIDDA

MANAMA
NEW DELHI
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DACCA
KARACHI
CANBERRA
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